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Reconciling Equal Employment
Opportunity With Seniority: The Case
For Sensitive Application Of Traditional
Equitable Principles
John H. Powell, Jr.*
I. Introduction
High unemployment rates of recent years exacerbate the prob-
lem of eliminating job discrimination in the United States. Lack of
new jobs and an increasing number of layoffs have a disparate im-
pact on minority and women employees and, as a result, a line of
demarcation between minority and women employees hired before
enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act1 and older
white employees has been created. This line demarks the perpetua-
tion via plantwide seniority rules of past systems of job distribution
that improperly excluded women and minorities from more desirable
jobs. Eradication of this line is an essential national goal toward
which use and expansion of equitable remedies under federal job
discrimination laws should be directed.
Central to understanding this problem is recognition that
high unemployment rates have resurrected the adverse effects of past
discrimination in a manner contravening the Title VII rights of a
group of incumbent minority and women employees. This group
consists of older employees who can show that, but for past discrimi-
nation, they would have attained the seniority status necessary to in-
sulate them from layoffs. Juxtaposed against the Title VII rights
of this group are the seniority expectations of many white male in-
cumbent employees. Judge Wisdom succinctly portrayed this prob-
lem in Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States2 when he stated, "In this case we deal with one of the most
perplexing issues troubling the courts under Title VII: how to rec-
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mission on Civil Rights; A.B., Howard University; J.D., Harvard University School
of Law; LL.M., New York University School of Law. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges the contributions of John Stoviak of the Pennsylvania bar.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
2. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
oncile equal employment opportunity today with seniority expecta-
tions based upon yesterday's built-in racial discrimination."3
In its recent landmark decision of Franks v. Bowman Transpor-
tation Co.4 the Supreme Court opted for the side of achieving
equal employment opportunity today. It held that an award of
retroactive seniority status to job applicants who had previously been
denied employment because of their race was an appropriate remedy
under Title VII. This analysis shows that the rationale adopted by
the Court in Franks should be employed in other situations so that
today's employer actions will be completely purged of yesterday's
discriminatory hiring and job assignment practices.
II. Evolution of Title VII Issues
Passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act5 was a
significant breakthrough in terms of the long-standing need for feder-
al legal authority6 to guarantee fundamental individual rights protect-
ed under two of the Civil War amendments. 7 Prior to its passage,
racial discrimination in employment had become firmly entrenched.
Minority Americans, particularly Blacks, and women had been
generally relegated to the least desirable, lowest paying jobs. Work
allocation rules with overtly discriminatory and exclusionary im-
pacts were an accepted nationwide practice.8 Without some na-
tional impetus directed toward its elimination, the problem of racial
and sexual discrimination in employment would have continued una-
bated. However, the civil rights demonstrations of the late 1950's and
early 1960's created a favorable political climate for the passage of
meaningful civil rights legislation. This was the setting in which Title
VII was passed. Its purpose is to achieve free and open competition
for jobs, i.e., competition that is unfettered by discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.9
3. Id. at 982-83.
4. 424 U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
6. The Civil Rights Act was grounded upon congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. Subsequent court decisions, however,
suggest that, as regards race discrimination, its proscriptions and prohibitions might
well have been grounded upon the fundamental rights afforded minority Americans
under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII & XIV.
8. Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity, 23 RUTGERs L.
REv. 268, 273 (1969).
9. As was observed by Chief Justice Burger in a seminal Supreme Court opin-
ion,
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to disciminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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The federal enforcement mechanisms created by Title VII, al-
though not totally efficacious, have helped dramatically change the
grossly discriminatory employment practices formerly applicable to
minorities and women. The rules and, to a lesser extent, the prac-
tices governing competition for jobs and promotional opportunities
are now quite different. Minority and female job applicants and
candidates for promotions may no longer be summarily consigned to
the "leftovers" in terms of access to more desirable job categories. 10
While minorities and women still do not enjoy employment oppor-
tunities commensurate with those available to white males, they now
are less likely to encounter overt forms of discrimination."
The more blatant forms of discrimination that characterized pre-
Title VII employment practices have been largely displaced by post-
Title VII employment practices that purport to be "objective" or
"neutral," but, nevertheless, may have a prohibited exclusionary ef-
fect.12 This change in the type of employment practices that discrim-
inatorily affect minority and women workers has altered the issues
currently confronting courts. Also, changes in the economy since the
passage of Title VII have affected the type of questions before courts
today. The early development of judicial solutions under Title VII
occurred at a time when the economy was expanding. The
courts at that time were dealing with problems of revising entrenched
hiring and job assignment patterns.' 3  Once principles requiring
elimination of those patterns were enunciated, however, the focus of
Title VII questions facing the courts turned from job and promotion
opportunities to job security. Another reason for this shift was the
10. See generally Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employ-
ment Laws, 82 HARv. L. RaV. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper & Sobol].
11. Even so, recent census data indicates that the significant progress achieved
by Blacks in education has, as yet, not resulted in job market parity vis-a-vis Blacks
and Whites. For example, as regards males between 25 and 64 years old, black col-
lege graduates generally earn less than white high school graduates. The median in-
come for the former was $8,383, as compared to $8,951, for the latter. Census of
Population: 1970 Subject Reports, Final Report P C (2) 8B, Earnings by Occupation
and Education. Much of this difference is attributable to employment discrimina-
tion.
12. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Palmer v. General
Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1975); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 9, at 1600.
Another reason is that the overt forms of racism were eventually replaced by covert
or sub rosa arrangements. Discriminatory practices frequently rested upon unwritten
understandings which, though not explicitly included within the written terms and
conditions of the underlying collective bargaining agreement, nevertheless, were
observed in practice. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incum-
bent Negro, 80 HAsv. L. Rnv. 1260 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
reduction in the national supply of jobs in recent years in relation to
the number of job seekers. Because of all of this, courts have been
encountering questions that relate to Title ViI's impact on a discrim-
inatee's job "rights" subsequent to entry into the national work force.
III. Appropriateness of Granting Affirmative Seniority Relief
A. Statutory Mandates of Title VII
Typical of the different type of Title VII issues presently con-
fronting courts is the difficult question of whether seniority status
computed under facially neutral plant-wide seniority systems that
operate in a manner that "locks in" and perpetuates subordinate
employment status created by earlier discriminatory hiring and job
assignment practices 4 are consistent with Title VII requirements.
Resolution of this issue entails a balancing of equities very similar to
that undertaken by Judge Wisdom in Local 189.1 Courts faced with
problems of this type must decide whether they can and should re-
vamp a seniority system that is itself "neutral," but perpetuates, in
its operation, past discrimination.
Section 706(g) of Title VII' 6 grants federal courts broad equi-
table discretion to correct discriminatory practices.
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally en-
gaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the re-
spondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be,
responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.'7
14. Such discriminatory practices have been illegal at least since 1944. In that
year the Supreme Court held that a union's designation as exclusive bargaining
representative under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), implied a duty
of fair representation in favor of minority workers in the bargaining unit. Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 232 U.S. 192 (1944). In 1955 this doctrine was
extended to unions designated as exclusive bargaining agents under comparable
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). Syres v.
Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955).
Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) has been held to provide a federal cause of
action to remedy private employment discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway
Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
15. See text at note 3 supra. See also Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed
Economy: the Layoff Problem, 23 UCLA L. REv. 177, 202 (1975). For precedent
in the circuits on the "departmental seniority" issue, see cases cited, id. at n. 20.
The Court's opinion in Franks makes it clear that the perpetuation rationale of these
cases should also apply in situations involving facially neutral plant-wide seniority
systems (see text infra).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(g) (1970).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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In conferring this broad equitable discretion on federal courts Con-
gress intended to effectuate one of Title VH's central purposes-i.e.,
that of making "persons whole for injuries suffered on account of un-
lawful employment discrimination." 8 The legislative history to the
1972 amendments of section 706(g) makes this clear:
The provisions of [section 706(g)] are intended to give the
courts wide discretion in exercising their equitable powers to
fashion the most complete relief possible .... [Tihe Act is in-
tended to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion whole and . . . the attainment of this objective . . . re-
quires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects
of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, re-
stored to a position where they would have been were it not for
the unlawful discrimination.19
B. Early Judicial Precedents
The clear mandate of the 1972 amendments to section 706(g)
that courts should freely exercise their equitable discretion to effec-
tuate Title VII's "make-whole" objective comports with the deci-
sions of two earlier Title VII cases, Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.2"
and Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States.2 In these "departmental seniority" cases,22 which dealt pri-
marily with past "on the job" discrimination such as discriminatory
job assignments and segregated lines of seniority progression, two
important legal precedents were established.
First, the courts in both cases found that defendants' present
facially neutral seniority rules perpetuated or "locked in" the subordi-
nate seniority status of minorities and women that had been created
by past "on the job" discrimination.2 3  The fact that defendants'
18. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
19. 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972).
20. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
21. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
22. ",Departmental seniority," as opposed to "benefit seniority," is one of sev-
eral forms of "competitive status seniority." Competitive status seniority is used to
determine priorities among employees for promotion, job seniority, shift preference,
and other employment advantages. By contrast, benefit seniority is used without re-
gard to the status of other employees to determine the eligibility of a given employee
for certain types of fringe benefits, such as paid vacations or sick leave. In applying
competitive status seniority arrangements, companies differ as to the organizational
unit within which seniority operates. Length of service may be measured with the
employer ("plant" or "mill" seniority), in a department ("department" seniority), or
in a job ("job" seniority).
23. 416 F.2d at 988; 279 F. Supp. at 516-17.
present seniority systems were facially neutral was held to be irrele-
vant because the nub of the legal injury was perpetuation of the
minority's subordinate seniority status. In Local 189 the court de-
clared,
It is not decisive therefore that a seniority system may ap-
pear to be neutral on its face if the inevitable effect of tying
the system to the past is to cut into the employees present right
not to be discriminated against on the ground of race. The crux
of the problem is how far the employer must go to undo the ef-
fects of past discrimination.
24
The second important precedent set forth in Local 189 and
Quarles resulted from the courts' responses to the question of how far
an employer must go to undo the effects of past discrimination. Both
courts held that the "affected class" should be granted affirmative
seniority relief that, though it did not include the right to bump encum-
bent white male employees, gave minority employees with greater
plant seniority a superior right to fill job vacancies.2" This early use
of the "rightful place" doctrine mirrors section 706(g)'s present
mandate that discriminatees be made whole.
C. Judicial Recalcitrance in Plant-Wide Seniority Cases
Despite the precedents set forth in Quarles and Local 189 and the
explicit language of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, courts, prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 6 were reluctant to grant affirmative seniority relief in plant-wide
seniority cases. Their reluctance was based on three arguments.
First, it was contended that granting affirmative seniority relief
adversely affected the expectancy interests of majority male employees
who had sufficient seniority as compared with minority employees to
insulate themselves from the danger of being laid off.27  These
24. 416 F.2d at 988 (emphasis in the original).
25. Id.; 279 F. Supp. at 520. But compare Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
387 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974) and Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8
BNA FAIR EMP. PRAC. GAS. 778 (E.D. Va. 1974), both of which indicate that, in
some situations, courts may include limited "bumping rights" as part of the relief
granted to Title VII plaintiffs when such relief is necessary to ameliorate continuing
effects of past discrimination.
26. 424 U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976).
27. A person's seniority status also affects many other important aspects of a
worker's life.
Included among the benefits, options, and safeguards affected by com-
petitive status seniority, are not only promotion and layoff, but also trans-
fer, demotion, rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vaca-
tion, order of layoff, possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, "bump-
ing" possibilities in the face of layoff, order of recall, training opportunities,
working conditions, length of layoff endured without reducing seniority,
length of layoff recall rights will withstand, overtime opportunities, parking
658
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expectancy interests arose from collective bargaining agreements that
had been given special stature pursuant to the federal policy2 ex-
pressed in the National Labor Relations Act.
2 9
Second, opponents of affirmative seniority relief referred to sec-
tion 703 (h) of Title VIFIs as a bar to granting such equitable relief.
The pertinent part of section 703 (h) states:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Title, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply dif-
ferent standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority...
system. . . provided that such differences are not the result of
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin .... al
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion in Franks
based its refusal to grant affirmative seniority relief to one subclass
of plaintiffs on section 703(h). It reasoned that a discriminatory
refusal to hire "does not affect the bona fides of the seniority system."
Proceeding from this premise, the court concluded, "Thus, the differ-
ences in the benefits and conditions of employment which a seniority
system accords to older and newer employees is protected as 'not an
unlawful employment practice.' "32
Third, it was argued that modifications of a neutral, plantwide
seniority system should be avoided because such modifications were
the equivalent of granting "fictional" seniority, i.e., seniority not
based on length of time actually on the job, to minorities on a prefer-
ential basis.3" Proponents of this argument noted that plant-
privileges, and, in one plant, a preferred place in the punch-out line.
Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 487, 490 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
28. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), employ-
ees of covered employers are afforded important organizational rights. In sum, these
rights are that employees have the federally protected right to organize and freely
elect a union of their choice as their exclusive bargaining representative. A union so
designated can bind all employees in the bargaining unit that it represents to the
terms and conditions of employment included in a collective bargaining agreement.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(h) (1970).
31. Id.
32. 495 F.2d 398, 417 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1251
(1976).
33. For instance the Seventh Circuit stated:
Title VII mandates that workers of every race be treated equally ac-
cording to their earned seniority. It does not require . . . that a worker
be granted fictional seniority or special privileges because of his race. ...
Under the employment seniority system there is equal recognition of em-
659
wide seniority cases differed from the departmental seniority cases
such as Quarles and Local 189. The latter cases granted seniority
relief to minority workers for the time that they had in a segregated
line of seniority progression ("earned" seniority), while the plant-
wide seniority challenges sought seniority credit for time when the
minority worker did not work because the defendant had discrimi-
nately refused to hire him ("fictional" seniority). This distinction,
they contended, undermined the precedential value of the departmen-
tal seniority cases and revealed how the grant of "fictional" seniority
right was supposedly preferential treatment that is prohibited by
section 703 (j) of Title VII. 4
IV. The Franks Decision
These three reasons for refusing to exercise the equitable discre-
tion given to courts by section 706(g) to grant affirmative seniority
relief to minority and women employees are no longer viable. The
Supreme Court conclusively rejected all three arguments in its recent
landmark decision of Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.35 The
Franks case clearly established the propriety of the judicial exercise of
equitable discretion to award seniority rights to minority workers
whom defendant discriminately refused to hire.
In Franks, Bowman Transportation Company ("Bowman") had
engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices involving
the hiring and discharge of their over-the-road (OTR) truck drivers.
A class action alleging Title VII violations was brought by both em-
ployee and non-employee discriminatees. The district court identi-
fied four classes of plaintiffs based on type of discrimination suffered
and their employee or non-employee status. Two classes consisted of
applicants for OTR driving positions-a non-employee group (class
3) and an employee group (class 4). The district court enjoined
Bowman from continuing the discriminatory practices, but denied the
class 3 and 4 plaintiffs' claims for back pay and retroactive seniority
status. These plaintiffs appealed this denial of relief. The Court of
ployment seniority which preserves only the earned expectations of long-
service employees.
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Workers of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1319 (7th
Cir. 1974) (U.S. appeal pending).
34. Section 703(j) states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with re-
spect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer . . . in comparison
with the total number or percentage of [such] persons . . . in any commu-
nity . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) (emphasis added).
35. 424 U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 1251 (1976).
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 6 vacated the district court's decision
regarding back pay as to both classes, reversed the decision on
retroactive seniority status of class 4 plaintiffs, but affirmed the deci-
sion denying retroactive seniority status to class 3 plaintiffs. The
Fifth Circuit's decision distinguished between employee and non-
employee plaintiffs' eligibility for the remedy of retroactive seniority
status. It was this issue, "whether identifiable applicants who were
denied employment because of race after the effective date and in
violation of Title VII. . .may be awarded seniority status retroactive
to the dates of their employment applications,"37 that the Supreme
Court addressed." The Court, speaking through Justice Brennan,
reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision by holding that an award of
retroactive seniority status was appropriate for the class 3 plaintiffs. 9
The Court began its opinion by directly rejecting the Fifth
Circuit's view that section 703(h) barred the grant of retroactive or
affirmative seniority relief.4" The Court noted that the plaintiffs were
not seeking a "modification or elimination of the existing seniority sys-
tem, but only an award of the seniority status they would have
individually enjoyed under the present system but for the illegal
discriminatory refusal to hire."'" Once the Court defined the issue
in this manner, it reasoned that section 703(h) had no relevance
because it was "only a definitional provision . . . [that] delineates
which employment practices are illegal. . . .-4 The Court then
concluded that section 703(h) "does not expressly purport to qualify
or proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under the remedial provi-
sions of Title VII. .. .
In rejecting section 703(h) as a barrier to seniority relief, the
Court was not troubled by the much discussed 44 legislative history of
the section. The Court did not attempt to decipher the unusual
legislative history; instead, it summarily declared that "the legislative
36. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. 424 U.S. -, -, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1257 (1976).
38. In addition to this issue, the Court preliminarily addressed a mootness
question. Id. at-, 96 S.Ct. at 1258-60.
39. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1261.
40. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
41. 424 U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1261 (emphasis added).
42. Id., citing Comment, Last Hired, First Fired Seniority, Layoffs, and Title
VII, 11 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 343, 376, 378 (1975).
43. 424 U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1261.
44. E.g., Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1544, 1548-53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Last Hired, First Fired].
history of § 703(h) plainly negates its reading as limiting or qualify-
ing the relief authorized under § 706 (g)."45
The Court's refusal to treat the confusing legislative history of
section 703(h) as limiting the equitable relief available under Title
VII was sound. The portion of the legislative history that is relied
on by proponents of a remedially restrictive view of Title VII includes
the Clark-Case memorandum,40 a Department of Justice memoran-
dum,47 and an exchange of questions and answers between Senators
Clark and Dirksen." The force of these materials is of doubtful
validity because they were each introduced and employed in debate
over a bill that was not enacted by Congress. In short, the "dispute"
addressed by these materials concerning the effect of the act was
finally "reconciled" by "new" language in a substitute bill. This
substitute bill, which contained what is now section 703(h), was
introduced on May 26, 1964 after Congress had heard and presum-
ably considered the views contained in these materials. Therefore,
when interpreting section 703(h) it is more reliable to rely on its
actual language as the Supreme Court did, rather than upon legisla-
tive history that pertains to a prior bill that was not adopted.49
The Court next considered "whether an award of seniority relief
is appropriate under the remedial provision of Title VII, specifically §
706(g). '"50 It answered this question affirmatively, reasoning that a
grant of retroactive seniority was necessary because:
Adequate relief may well be denied in the absence of a seniority
remedy slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system
that would have been his had he been hired at the time of his
application. It can hardly be questioned that ordinarily such re-
lief will be necessary to achieve the "make-whole" purposes of
the Act."1
The Court emphasized the important rights and benefits affected by
seniority status5 2 and concluded that "merely to require Bowman to
hire the class 3 victim of discrimination falls far short of a 'make
whole' remedy."58
45. 424 U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1261.
46. 110 CoNG. REc. 7213 (1964).
47. 110 CONG. Rac. 7207 (1964).
48. 110 CONo. REc. 11,926, 11,931 (1964).
49. After exploring the confusion on this point, which is implicit in the legisla-
tive history of Title VII, one commentator concluded:
It is perhaps not unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that Congress chose
to leave the resolution of the problems posed by seniority to the courts
rather than codify in the Act the concerns expressed in the Senate debates.
Last Hired, First Fired, supra note 44, at 1550 (emphasis added).
50. 424 U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1263.
51. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1265.
52. The Court stated that "[sleniority systems and entitlements conferred by
credits earned thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in the economic
employment system of this Nation." id.
53. Id.
662
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The Court went on to find that there was no support in Title VII
for the Fifth Circuit's differentiation in its remedial treatment of class
4 employee discriminatees and class 3 non-employee discriminatees.54
This finding indicated an implicit and correct recognition by the
Court that the distinction, which courts previously had been making,
between "earned" and "fictional" seniority did not encompass a
meaningful difference. As one commentator prophetically declared:
The distinction between earned and fictional seniority seems to
respond to a moral perception that it is improper to grant senior-
ity credit to one who did not work to acquire it. Such a distinc-
tion might seem justified if the comparison were between two
persons both of whom could have worked, but one of whom did
not. However, where minority applicants were refused jobs and
thus prevented from acquiring seniority in the usual manner, no
fault can attach to their failure to do so. It seems anomalous
to hold that the seniority of minority workers subjected to par-
tial discrimination, that is those who were hired but assigned to
less desirable jobs, must be recomputed but that the seniority
of minority workers who were entirely excluded from the work
force cannot be recomputed.55
In support of its conclusion that section 706(g) permitted an
award of affirmative seniority relief, the Court cited cases construing
section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)." Jus-
tice Brennan reasoned that since section 10(c) of the NLRA was
model for section 706(g) of Title VII the section 10(c) cases grant-
ing affirmative seniority relief57 were applicable precedent for Title
VII cases.
5 8
Having established that affirmative seniority relief was an appro-
priate equitable remedy under section 706(g), the Court still had to
contend with the fact that the district court had exercised its discre-
tion and refused to grant this remedy to class 3 plaintiffs. The Court
decided that the district court had abused its discretion and, in so
ruling, rejected the argument that, on the facts of that case, it was
within the district court's discretion to deny this form of relief as an
accommodation to the competing interests of other groups of em-
ployees.5"
54. Id.
55. Last Hired, First Fired, supra note 42, at 1555.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
57. E.g., NLRB v. H.J. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969); Local
60, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
651, 657 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. 424 U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1266.
59. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1267. The stated district court's reasons for denial
The Court's discussion of this issue largely resolved a problem
that had been previously troubling courts: how the competing
equities of the expectancy interests of majority male employees and
public policy goals of Title VII should be balanced. The Court de-
clared:
[W]e find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may
be denied merely because the interests of other employees may
thereby be affected. "If relief under Title VII can be denied
merely because the majority group of employees, who have not
suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be
little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is di-
rected." 60
In buttressing its position the Court noted that "a sharing of the
burden of past discrimination is presumably necessary-[and that
such sharing] is entirely consistent with any fair characterization of
equity jurisdiction. ... "1 Then, Justice Brennan referred to a
number of Supreme Court cases that held "that employee expecta-
tions arising from a seniority system agreement may be modified by
statutes furthering a strong public policy interest.' 62 Moreover, com-
petitive status seniority rights cannot be considered vested rights
because it has been recognized that these rights may be abrogated
by revisions in -the underlying collective bargaining agreement.
63
Finally, the Court clearly stated its position in regard to how the
aforementioned equities should be balanced in footnote 41:
[O]ur holding is that in exercising their equitable powers, dis-
trict courts should take as their starting point the presumption
in favor of rightful place seniority relief, and proceed with fur-
ther legal analysis from that point; and that such relief may not
be denied on the abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests
of other employees but rather only on the basis of unusual ad-
verse impact arising from facts and circumstances that would
not be generally found in Title VII cases. 64
The importance of this direction was illustrated by the subsequent
remand of the EEOC v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co.65 case
to the Third Circuit for further consideration.
V. Conclusion
The Court's opinion in Franks laid to rest much of the contro-
of relief to class 3 members were dismissed by the Supreme Court. Id. at -, 96
S.Ct. at 1266.
60. Id. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1269, quoting from United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
61. 424 U.S. at -, 96 S.Ct. at 1270.
62. Id. (emphasis added), citing Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
63. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1964).
64. 424 U.S. at - n.41 (emphasis added), 96 S.Ct. at 1271.
65. - U.S. -, 44 U.S.L.W. 3669 (May 25, 1976).
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versy regarding what balance must be struck between the two impor-
tant public policy interests implicit in Title VII on the one hand and
job security computed on the basis of plant seniority on the other.
And while the facts before the Court in that case relate only to the
inferior seniority of the class 3 plaintiffs that was brought about by
post-Act hiring discrimination, it is noteworthy that this class consisted
entirely of job applicants who had not yet achieved any employee sta-
tus whatsoever vis-A-vis the defendant employee. Accordingly, there
can be little doubt that incumbent minority and female employees
whose relatively low seniority status is derived from pre-Act hiring dis-
crimination would be entitled to similar relief under the Court's rea-
soning.6 6 Concommitantly, in granting affirmative seniority relief, the
Court emphasized the essentially equitable character of the remedies
that may be afforded under Title VII in layoff situations even in the
currently depressed economy. This approach provides a meaningful
frame of reference within which the numerous permutations of this
knotty problem may now be resolved. For if sensitive use is made
of the familiar rules of equity, as was done in Franks, both the Title
VII rights of older minority and female employees as well as the em-
ployment expectancy interests of majority males may be accommo-
dated without unduly negating the legitimate employment interests
of either.
66. Significantly, for example, the Court in Franks explicitly noted without fur-
ther comment that "by its terms" the judgment of the district court in that case ex-
pressly extended to pre-Act discriminatory refusals to hire "and is not qualified by
a limitation [to post-Act discrimination] . . . ." 424 U.S. at - n.10, 96 S.Ct. at
1261. r '
